Technological change transforms labour markets. The use of new applications and tools brings about changes in the tasks performed by workers, the organization of work, and the quantity and type of available employment. This article explains how three key vectors of technological change in the digital era (automation of work, digitization of processes, and platformization of work) impact employment. It is observed that the use of new technologies, such as industrial robots, is not leading to widespread job destruction, while promoting increases in labor productivity; that technological change does not promote the existence of a universal pattern of job polarization but rather a variety of patterns, with job upgrading standing out; that digitization has facilitated the expansion of telework, although cultural and organizational barriers still hinder its wider adoption; and finally that the prevalence of platform work is still relatively small, although certain work organization forms typical of digital platforms have spread across various types of employment. This platformization of work is generating new risks and opportunities.

Our main conclusion is that new technologies have a transformative capacity rather than generating clear disruptive impacts. This is because the impact of technological change is mediated by other factors such as sociodemographic changes, regulation, institutional designs, or work organization, which is why deterministic views are rejected. Whether we can benefit from the potential offered by technology or are limited to suffering its negative effects ultimately depends on the policies developed, on how work is organised and on how labour relations and new forms of work are regulated.

The programme of work that we have developed has been structured around three main vectors of change, which we believe are the main ways in which digital technologies are affecting the world of work - for more details, see Fernández-macías ( 2018 ) -:

The automation of work
2 .The digitization of processeshow, with a focus on the use of digital tools working environments in the changing nature of work.

We have been decades of a recurring basis, listening to new technologies are able to execute tasks which so far as there were only able to carry out the rights, and therefore will lead to an early replacement of jobs on a large scale. Undoubtedly, there are activities for which there has been replaced by employment machines: consider, for example, in the use of automated machinery for the processing and packaging of food, or in the use of robots in assembly lines for repetitive tasks and precise, such as welding, painting or assembly. It is often argues that these processes could, in the near future, lead to mass unemployment, since a large part of the labour force would cease to be necessary. However, despite the fact that such arguments have proliferated in apocalyptic means and even in some academia (a phenomenon also known as the anxiety about automation), the recent history of Europe in this connection, it is essentially a positive story.

Using the international database of more detailed and rich on robots in industry, developed by the international federation of Robotics (IFR), we developed a number of investigations that reveals the following – more info on these investigations in torrejón Pérez et al. ( 2020 ) -:

• first, that the current robotsthere are a generic technology and of broad application, but a very specialized technology, used mainly in selected industrial subsectors (Fernández-macías et al. 2021 , Klenert et al. 2022 ). The density is just high in the automotive industry, and to a lesser extent in the plastics and metals (figure 1 ). In other industrial sectors, as well as in the full range of services, robots are rarely used.

impactthat is ¹

impacts

at the national and regional and over varying periods.

2 . That, within this range and over the long term, the pattern of occupational change more visible on a global scale is

A global scale and in the long term, if we look at the occupational change in the early decades of the twenty-first century, we see that most countries have experienced occupational improvement processes. This is due to several causes, including: the tertiarisation of the economy (in the last decades has destroyed much agricultural employment, manufacturing and construction has increased, while the weight of services in both absolute and relative terms), as well as the increase in the educational level of the population, the expansion of public services and the incorporation of more people in general, particularly women, in sectors such as health and education. Given that all this has happened in many countries on a global scale (from Europe to India via Latin America and russia), that is why the patterns of occupational improvement in the long term on a global scale, despite extensive institutional and cultural differences.

technology has not led to a uniform standard of polarization of employment

In short, in the debate on the changes in the division of labour and occupational structures, we have to avoid visions deterministas. Overall, the increase in the educational level, the tertiarisation, the expansion of public services and the mainstreaming of women in labour market explain why it has created both quality employment throughout the world, but not the differences between countries and regions in relation to what happens to the jobs of lower quality. this is what really determines whether or not occupational polarization. To explain these differences, we must pay more attention to factors including institutional and political.

Technological change in general, and more precisely the digitization, have also been the prerequisite for the expansion of telework in recent years, although it is obvious that its sudden widespread throughout the world 2020 was mainly due to the pandemic arising from the COVID- 19 . However the digitization generated the necessary conditions for this transformation could take place, as well as to the labour markets could demonstrate during the months and years greater resilience.

According To Eurostat, prior to the pandemic (in 2019 ), in the eu 27 only 5 . 4 per cent of total employees working from home, usually the case of a figure which had remained constant since 2009 . During a pandemic ( 2020 and 2021 ), this percentage rose up 12 - 13 %, stabilizing in 2022 on the 10 % (double the value pre-pandemia). Pre valencia teleworking varies greatly across sectors and occupations, being particularly high in the knowledge-intensive services and information and communication technologies (ICT). This inequality is reflected economic: access telework is much wider among workers with higher incomes. Obviously, these differences are at least in part to the activities and tasks in some sectors and occupations are not susceptible, logistically and technical, to develop remotely. However, there are other cultural barriers and organizational framework for the difference in the pre valencia between sectors and occupations, as well as the fact that its implementation, in general, it is more widespread:

• we know that telecommutingit is much more common in more than in others, even when they require intensive also use computers and digital tools. For example, are clear differences in this regard among workers in customer service or clerks (with relatively low telecommuting), on the one hand, and managers and professionals on the other (with very high levels). In general, occupations with higher level of self-employment (less subject to monitoring and direct control) tend to enjoy better telecommuting options.

• the different role that the occupations and sectors likelyto develop remotely in different locations explains some of the differences between countries. Thus, while that teleworking is relatively common in some countries where intensive services in knowledge and ict activities are given more weight (as the nordic countries, the netherlands, belgium or Luxembourg), is very rare in countries where the weight of these occupations is lower (such as romania, italy, greece, croatia, hungary and spain), as illustrated in figure 5 .

however, digital platforms may also be costs and risks for workers: firstly, the workers of platforms are in most cases self-employed, this despite the fact that the working conditions of these people are more akin to those of employees. As a result, you may not be covered by basic labour rights, such as sick leave, holidays, minimum wage, pension rights and similar ²

^{3 4} . However, the proportion of people who ever developed this kind of services is higher: secondary workers platforms (those who develop this type of work, but not as the main form of employment) ⁵

Successive waves of COLLEEM had enabled the profile of workers of platforms: the typical worker tends to be younger, more educated and more prone to live in a larger home, in large cities, and with dependent children. The workers of platforms are also more likely to be both men and of having been born abroad, especially if they are involved in the performance of tasks, phenomenon that has been increasing despite the fact that the majority of workers of platforms in europe provide remote services of highly skilled workers. We also note that the working conditions for workers are too heterogeneous platforms, depending on the type of work, its intensity and frequency. However, it is important to note that more than half of workers who are working on such platforms as main form of employment viewed its work is often stressful.

5 . 2 . The plataformización: algorithmic management and control of workers

Although the job in platforms was relatively small, in recent years, we have seen some of the forms of organization of work of the digital platforms are being extended to all kinds of jobs. This phenomenon, we call plataformización, predominantly affects workers using digital tools and are subject to a certain degree of algorithmic management. This latter term refers to the use of tools and procedures for algorítmicos coordinated working. The algorithmic management can alter substantially the organization of work (Baiocco et al. 2022 ). On the one hand, can improve production processes, creating profits of efficiency and productivity improvements. On the other, this form of management tends to standardize work, centralized decision-making and increase the degree of control on workers, and all this could undermine the quality of employment and the autonomy of workers, increasing the psychosocial risks in the work environment. It is important to bear in mind also that the labour plataformización entails a greater degree of control and monitoring of the digital workers, which may result in a deterioration of your privacy and autonomy.

Therefore, it is increasingly clear that the plataformización can have important consequences socio-económicas regulatory and that it is necessary to know better. For this reason, we have tried to develop new indicators and measures on pre valencia and purpose of managing labour algorithmic, creating the new Survey Algorithmic management and labour of platforms – AMPWork- carried out in Spain and germany 2022 (Fernandez Macias et al. 2023 ). AMPWork reveals that a significant proportion of workers use digital devices in their daily work (the 65 . 4 % in spain and the 61 . 5 % in germany) and is subject to some control digital or, less frequently, to some kind of algorithmic management. The highest levels of plataformización of work are in high-tech industries, knowledge-intensive services and public administration. According To AMPWork the most common form of algorithmic management is the allocation of speaking slots or automated time through a digital device, followed by the allocation of tasks automated. There is a low percentage of workers but whose work is determined by a digital device or follow the instructions, or automated indications at work. In terms of working conditions, work plataformizado procedures associated with more detailed and complex, as well as with higher levels of autonomy and flexibility that traditional employees. On the other hand, these workers suffer more stress and are more exposed to procedures and monotonous unusual schedules (see fig. 8 ).

Despite these differences, an important element in common of all technologies analysed (of a greater or lesser degree of technical sophistication) is that all of them have inherent in a strong potential to be used in the control and monitor the workers since they enable collect a wide range of data on children that can be used, for example, to control their performance. It is important to note that the use of algorithms for management of labour does not need to be explicit or intentional even to have direct consequences in terms of organization of work, working conditions and industrial relations. In many cases, the technologies that we have analysed have implications relevant in these respects, even if they are not directly intended to be used for the coordination of work. In fact, often algorithmic management is a kind of unintended result of using certain tools for managing processes in a broader sense. It is hoped that the widespread use of artificial intelligence in the workplace can amplify these effects, which will require further research to identify challenges and opportunities and to support the design of new policies and regulatory instruments that, surely, will be required.

The discussions we have dealt with focus on the impact of new technologies in the labour market. Discussions that often have been copados by arresting, holding that sometimes have gone further to promote a certain anxiety for automation. In this context, our work suggests that, at least on the basis of the recent european experience, these fears are unfounded.

On the contrary, the evidence on the impact of the use of robots in terms of employment is mixed, and the effects that are often identified small and tend to be, in some recent studies, positive. In that regard, the use of robots associates itself with greater resilience. Moreover, its impact in terms of productivity is clearly positive.

more visible on a global scale and in the long term is one of occupational improvement, which indicates that the jobs that have grown most are for highly qualified and wages. This occupational improvement is associated with major changes taking place around the world, as the tertiarisation, the greatest achievement of education, the entry of women into the labour market and the expansion of public services. In places where there has been occupational polarization, this phenomenon is often more linked to processes of deregulation of labour, the lack of public investment or the precarization of public employment.

Thirdly, because we know that what they have made new technologies is to enable telecommuting quickly ’. However, following the COVID, andl percentage of people who teletrabaja was considerably less, that the proportion of jobs that, due to its technical characteristics, are likely to be done remotely

Fourthly, we have seen that the work has been consolidated platforms in europe as a relatively small but significant while,some forms of organization of work of the platforms (the use of digital devices to monitor the work, the management of algorithmic processes, etc.) is being extended to all kinds of jobs. In this case, the plataformización work may be advantages (greater flexibility and autonomy) but it raises important future challenges in terms of quality of employment, privacy and control of work. They are the positive or negative impacts that prevail in the medium and long term will depend, ultimately and as so many other cases, in the manner in which regulate this new form of control and management of the work.

6 . 2 . Implications for employment policy: the technology matters, but the institutions and regulation median their effects

In the previous sections, are some of the recent trends in the labour market and we note that technological change is not associated with the proliferation of problems such as mass unemployment, polarization occupational or reduced levels of autonomy in employment. Instead, on many fronts is generating opportunities: creating greater resilience to employment, promoting productivity increases and improved processes occupational, etc. This is our first contribution to the extent that serves us to question many diagnosis (doom). We, instead, we offer a less pessimistic. Certainly we see no clear negative impact of technology in terms of employment, although we are somewhat more cautious in assessing the impact of the use of algorithms and digital tools to control and manage the work on the nature of employment and the organization of work.

We are less pessimistic or, perhaps more precise, less deterministas. This is because, as with most of changes and transformations, these are associated to a number of advantages and disadvantages. In this context, which underlines our research, and we believe that this is one of the elements that provide greater added value to the debate, is that the fact that some effects prevail (positive) or other (bad) does not depend only on the nature of the technical change, but also of the regulation, policies and how the work.

We know, for example, to invest in physical capital and encourage the deployment of robots in the workplace can serve to boost productivity and employment. That we can try to prevent occupational polarization processes through industrial policy or the creation of quality public employment (in sectors such as education, health or care), employment, which could otherwise be route through the generation of private services for low-wage countries. It as regulating the employment of platforms and the use of algorithms in dependent positive impacts prevail (or not) the negative ones. Despite the important regulatory effort that is developing recently both in Spain and in the european union, yet have the institutional and regulatory frameworks designed largely to forms of labour predigitales. In this context, the ability to adapt to these new realities, and to stimulate, regulate and govern the use of new technologies and new forms of work, rather than the fact that there is mass unemployment or occupational polarization, is probably the main challenge facing us today. For this reason we reject the deterministic perspectives on approaches and on technological change: because there is an unrelenting impact, but this is mediated by social factors, policy and cultural rights.

To know in depth the nature of the changes taking place in the labour market in the digital era is important to draw the full potential of new tools we use in the work. The new technologies or condemn us or save us: that we will be able to learn their full potential to create more and better jobs or suddenly faced only its negative impacts is ultimately in our hands. In this regard, we hope that the information we will serve to stimulate this type of discussion and promote better informed discussions, which could ultimately serve to enhance decision-making based on evidence

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